History 291: SUPERPOWER AMERICA

                                   

(Advanced Level)

The Versailles Treaty concluding World War I represented a tragic defeat for Woodrow Wilson. He failed both to steer the United States toward an irrevocable commitment to global engagement, and to establish and institutionalize a new framework and set of norms for the international order based on U.S. leadership. The attack on the United States by a foreign aggressor in December 1941 and America's participation in an Allied coalition during the Second World War, however, confirmed in fundamental respects for the vast majority within the policymaking and informed public communities the foresight of Wilson's policies. Indeed, when the United States emerged from the rubble of World War II as the world's leading economic and sole atomic power, Washington seized on this "second chance" to wield its power for the purpose of constructing the international environment that Wilson had prescribed: a Wilsonian world. Notwithstanding the vicissitudes inherent in historical evolution and the intent of each president to stamp his personal imprimatur on the foreign policies of his administration, this effort has remained the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy ever since. The tragic events of 911 and their aftermath, including the recently concluded War in Iraq, adds urgency to that effort even as the evidence accumulates of contemporary America's anti-Wilsonian proclivities.

This course traces the ebb and flow of America's pursuit of a Wilsonian World.  It will begin with the consequences of America's "Rendezvous With Destiny": the diplomacy of World War II and Franklin Roosevelt's vision of "Open Spheres" patrolled by "Four Policemen." With Roosevelt's death and the war's abrupt and violent termination, the ideal of multilateral cooperation rapidly gave way to bipolar competition; in other words, the Cold War. From Truman to Johnson, the United States waged the Cold War relentlessly.  The ever-increasing reliance on nuclear weapons with ever-increasing megatonnage did not produce Armageddon, as many feared. But it did produce stalemate in Korea, fiasco and crisis in Cuba, and quagmire in Vietnam among its spectrum of outcomes. Nixon's solution to the nuclear predicament was to count on Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) and triangular diplomacy (one component of which was detente) to deter war and promote stability. Reagan tried to escape the predicament by imagining "Star Wars." Then the sudden end to the Cold War caught everyone by surprise. As attested to by George H. W.  Bush's rhetorical "New World Order" and the inchoate efforts of Bill Clinton to "enlarge" global democracy and promote free market economies, a rudderless policymaking community in Washington could find no one to whom to turn other than--Woodrow Wilson. 

It is far too early to draw confident judgments about the foreign policies of  George W. Bush. What is clear is that there has been a notable gap between rhetoric and behavior. Despite Bush's disparagement of so many Wilsonian precepts during his campaign for the presidency, he has committed the United States more deeply to nation-building than even did John F. Kennedy, and he waged war on Iraq for reasons that included and went beyond "making the world safe for democracy." Conversely, by bypassing the UN Security Council in order to launch a preemptive (in contrast to preventive) attack on Iraq, the current administration has manifested little concern for the principles of collective security, multilateralism,  and the  norms of international law that form the core of Wilsonianism. As a result, the international image of the United States is at a historic low. The Bush administration would argue, however, that international respect for the United States is at a historic high, and Bush's approval ratings domestically remain significantly better than the nation's economic performance would historically warrant. What effect these interrelated phenomena will have on the foundations of U.S. foreign relations remains to be determined. This course will seek to answer this question even as the presidential election season unfolds.

Overlaying this narrative history are multiple interrelated themes the course will explore. These themes include the political economy of national security; the tension between America's idealistic impulses and the perceived need to behave "realistically" in a frequently hostile environment; the impact of domestic (political, economic, cultural, ideological, and psychological) influences on foreign policy; the emergence of bipolarism and Soviet-American antagonism; the challenge to bipolarism posed by the Third World and regional disputes. and since the end of the Cold War, the creation of a "unilateral moment"; atomic diplomacy and the balance of terror; "existential deterrence" and arms limitation; crisis management and avoidance; the end of the Cold War and  implications of the former Soviet (i.e., Russian) empire's collapse for restructuring the global system, reordering America's international priorities, and producing a national strategy that succeeds "containment;" the relationship between intelligence collection, assessment, and policy formation; and, finally (gasp), the challenges confronting the United States as it seeks to manage its contemporary empire by concurrently institutionalizing its global military and economic supremacy, retaining the allegiance of its allies, punishing the "evil-doers," brokering regional disputes, building states and societies, constructing defenses against all forms of weapons of mass destruction, and, of course, waging a war on ill-defined terrorists,  In short, this course examines war, peace, stability, and everything in between.

The assigned readings reflect an array of interpretations and approaches to the study of the history of U.S. foreign policy.  Rather than schedule "formal discussions," every class I encourage and provide ample opportunities for every student actively to respond to and question these interpretations. I even encourage and provide ample opportunities for every student actively to respond to and question my interpretation.  In addition, at least once each student will be required to present a succinct oral summary (2-3 minutes) of the fundamental issues (in contrast to historical narrative) raised in the previous session, and time will be allotted to examine and dissect the documents that are either available either on-line or in our assigned readings. Consequently, notwithstanding the relatively hefty readings for some weeks, and the more-than-occasional exercises in exposition and argumentation, each student will be expected to complete all assignments with the care and thoroughness necessary to formulate questions and participate actively in class discussions: challenging, probing, even arguing. 

 

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