Playing the China Card?
In 1969 the United States was in the throes of the War in Vietnam. Initially as national security advisor (NSA) to President Richard M. Nixon, and then as Nixon’s and Gerald Ford’s secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, confronted by what he perceived as the erosion of U.S. power and credibility produced by the Vietnam War, sought to redesign the architecture of the international system for the purpose of cementing America’s role as the fulcrum of the global balance of power. His means to this end was “Triangular Diplomacy.” In 1971 Kissinger initiated secret talks with the adversarial regimes in both Moscow and Beijing in an effort simultaneously to achieve détente with the Soviets and rapproachement with the Chinese—the prerequisites for systemic “equilibrium.”
More than a few historians have argued, nevertheless, that Kissinger’s chief priority was the containment of the Soviet Union, which he assessed as the gravest threat to the United States, its vital allies, and international stability. As a consequence, his fundamental objective was to pursue a “tacit” Sino-American alliance capable of thwarting Kremlin adventurism even as it provided the United States with additional leverage to influence Soviet behavior. In his memoirs Kissinger categorically denies this allegation, claiming that he was careful to avoid “tilting” toward either Communist behemoth.
Because of the secrecy with which Kissinger managed his diplomacy, and because he manipulated the disposition of his public as well as personal archives successfully to deny scholars access to them, the denial appearing in his memoirs had for decades been invulnerable to rigorous challenge. But that condition changed dramatically when William Burr of the National Security Archive published the declassified transcripts of Kissinger’s talks with the Chinese and the Soviets. Thus for the first time historians have available evidence to evaluate the charge that within the framework of his triangular diplomacy, Kissinger tilted toward Beijing.
You are about to become such a historian. Building on the experience you have gained in writing your op ed essays, In 10-15 double-spaced pages (if necessary you can extend your paper to 20 pages, but that is the limit), exploit evidence you cull from the documents reproduced in Burr’s The Kissinger Transcripts, and others subsequently released by the National Security Archive available on the course syllabus (http://isc.temple.edu/hist249/291week8_doc.htm), to support or reject the argument that Henry Kissinger covertly sought an anti-Soviet Sino-American alliance rather than merely Sino-American rapproachement. (You of course are free to take advantage of any other evidence that you can identify and locate so long as you cite it.) In the introduction of your paper, moreover, you should cite at least one secondary source (which you should find) that argues that Kissinger did or did not seek a tacit Sino-American alliance. Summarize the argument and the evidence that this sources uses as support for it, and explicitly articulate why your evidence provides more robust evidence confirming the argument in this secondary source—or disconfirming it. Put another way, converse with the author of the secondary source. Do not hesitate to discuss your progress with me as often as you find it beneficial.
You must cite each source on which you base both your narrative and your argument. I prefer endnotes to footnotes, and you should follow the guidelines in the Chicago Manual of Style. Available in the reference section of Paley Library, CMS explains and illustrates the stylistic conventions used by historians; you should become familiar with it and them. By this means you will gain valuable experience in producing scholarship. What is more, I expect your paper to be free of all mistakes in grammar, punctuation, and syntax; a model of coherence, logic, clarity, and fluidity; and a joy to read.