History 291
Superpower America
Fall 2002
Richard H. Immerman
What follows
below is more than a study guide. As I explained in my course
inaugural, one of
these exercises in thoughtful and painstaking analysis will appear—verbatim—on the mid-term examination.
I heartily recommend that you study them all, nevertheless;
I pride myself on my inscrutability, and the selection will be mine. Or maybe
I’ll allow my dog to make the choice. I certainly won’t allow you. Moreover,
I’ve manifestly grown soft in my old age.
Some words to the wise: Read each question several times. Determine what fundamental issues each question addresses, and formulate a thesis--or hypothesis--that responds directly to these issues. Never forget that historians do not “merely” tell a story (though we often do tell some whoppers). We interpret and argue. Thus organize your essay appropriately. Your introduction should explicitly respond to the question by stating your answer, interpretation, point of view, thesis, or whatever you want to call your argument. Then in the body of the essay cite—early and often—robust evidence to support what in the introduction you indicate that you intend to argue (the op ed essays you have written should have provided you with vast experience in this area0. By the time you reach the end, consequently, you should not need a conclusion. If you feel one is required, or worse, fear that you have not proven your case, or worse still, have contradicted yourself, start the process all over. Assume the role of an attorney preparing for a devastating cross-examination. And stay on point!
Not to rain on your
parade, but I must remind you that your essays will not constitute the totality
of your effort. I will expect you to identify and explain the historical
significance five out of seven. Your responses should be succinct and to the
point,* but they will take some time. Plan on a
minute or two for each—no more. At least five of the identifications will be
drawn from the list of terms that follow the lecture outlines.
1. When teaching the introductory survey of the History of the United States (e.g., History C068), an instructor may choose to periodize in a way that emphasizes conceptual themes and “change over time” at the expense of more chronological, event-based periodization. Indeed, one instructor of U.S. history, who will remain anonymous, at one prestigious U.S. university, which will likewise remain anonymous, recently presented both the Second Front controversy during World War II and the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as critical watersheds in the evolution of the Cold War Using both evidence and logic, provide an informed opinion as to whether this instructor's periodization is a violation of the “narrative” of twentieth century U.S. history. In other words, did he essentially mislead his students (most of whom had only the elementary knowledge of U.S. history acquired at the secondary-school level) by situating within events that preceded the surrender of Germany and Japan within the framework of events that succeeded that surrender?
2. Compare, contrast, and evaluate the fundamental strategies of Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Emphasize both the continuities and the changes, and evaluate the appropriateness of the label “New Look.” Paying particular attention to pp.1-120 in Freedman's Kennedy's Wars, conclude your essay by assessing the extent to which "Flexible Response" resembled Truman's strategy, Eisenhower's strategy, neither, or both.
3. A prominent scholar of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War has argued that historians invariably characterize U.S. policies, programs, and strategies from the death of Franklin Roosevelt in April 1945 to the approval of NSC 68 in September 1950 as either “wise,” “foolish,” or “prudent.” Selecting illustrations carefully and judiciously, and whenever possible referring to primary evidence (e.g., a document provided by this course's syllabus, one of the documents in Debating the Cold War), characterize U.S. policies, programs, and strategy during this period. Was it/Were they wise, foolish, or prudent? Be sure to define your terms, and if you are more comfortable fence-sitting, so sit. But still provide supporting evidence.
4. In a foreign service dispatch dated September 8, 1952, then U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan wrote, "In the United States . . . opinion rapidly coalesced to the effect that the North Korean attack was only the opening gambit in an elaborate program of Soviet armed aggression against the free world. The attack was subsequently freely cited in American official utterances as an example of new Soviet 'aggressiveness.'" How would you explain the "rapid" coalescence of U.S. opinion and the frequent citation of the attack as illustrating new Soviet "aggressiveness." Weigh the extent to which "internal" as opposed to "external phenomena" (for example domestic politics as opposed to threat assessments) influenced the U.S. response. Conclude by providing your evaluation of the U.S. response.
*Harry Truman: Former senator whom Democrats chose as their vice presidential candidate in 1944 because he was not considered a serious presidential contender in 1948 but who nevertheless accidentally became president upon the death of Franklin Roosevelt in 1945. Highly uninformed when he initially took office and predisposed to speaking loudly and carrying a big stick, Truman presided over the United States during the evolution and intensification of the Cold War.