In March 1974, two years after the signing of the SALT 1 treaty, negotiations continued to reduce the threat of nuclear war.
The following are excerpts of transcripts of discussions between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. They were recently uncovered and published in "The Kissinger Transcripts" by William Burr.
Brezhnev's Office, The Kremlin, March 25, 1974
Leonid Brezhnev: We start with strategic arms.
Henry Kissinger: Please. I gave to your ambassador, Mr. General Secretary, some ideas which we developed to advance the discussion. I don't know if we should use this as a starting point.
Leonid Brezhnev: I think we should basically proceed from the fact that our delegations discussing the matter find themselves deadlocked. They have engaged in discussions but have not moved very far. Past experience has shown that this is the time for decisions to be taken at a higher level.
Henry Kissinger: That is our view.
Leonid Brezhnev: I would just like to make an observation here: If we let our purely military men into this sphere we'll end up with an unprecedented arms race; I say that in a full sense of responsibility. Your military men and ours are the same. You can't really blame them. What they say is, we don't care about all these policies, and there is the secretary of defense saying the United States has to be militarily stronger. And there are others in the United States echoing these views and saying "We have to talk to the Soviet Union from a position of military strength."
Surely, Dr. Kissinger, if we let ourselves be carried away by that kind of talk, all our discussions will come to nothing. What we have based ourselves on in the past, and the greatness of what we have achieved, is that we first of all achieved a freeze of existing arms and agreed on reductions, but without changing the balance. Only on that basis can we maintain coexistence.
So let us endeavor to decide some at this level without giving new instructions at Geneva. If we achieve something, our delegates will talk a different language.
Henry Kissinger: I agree, this is the best way to proceed.
Leonid Brezhnev: But I really would like you to pay attention to this fact, all those statements about the United States needing to be strong.
Aleksandrov: Stronger.
Leonid Brezhnev: Unless we put a stop to this kind of talk in the United States, people will become accustomed to this need, that is, the need to talk to the Soviet Union from a position of strength. And not for the record, perhaps, but let me say that living generations of Americans have never experienced war on their own territory and never experienced a fascist advance as far as Stalingrad -- so they are prone to this kind of talk. Americans have not had 20 million deaths from war.
Gromyko: Think of how many widows and orphans there are.
Leonid Brezhnev: In Belorussia, every fourth person died in the war. That is why we in this country -- I can't speak for the United States -- are very sensitive to these issues. I have emphasized this to everyone -- to Chancellor [Willy] Brandt, for instance. Even if the Senate didn't appropriate additional sums of money to the Pentagon, and if the Pentagon didn't always shout about it, it would still be a very sensitive subject for us. But the sensitivity is heightened by these statements. We can't help it.
I would like to emphasize, Dr. Kissinger, you and I don't have an easy task before us, but we are duty bound -- I repeat, duty bound -- to find an acceptable solution, a solution which will give no advantage to either side. That is the principle we agreed on with President Nixon, and I would like to see it observed.
Henry Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, the entire policy of the administration is based on the presupposition that neither side can achieve military superiority over the other and should not attempt to achieve military superiority over the other. If either tries to talk to the other from a position of strength, it will be a disaster for our two peoples and for all mankind. I have made this point in every public statement, and so has the president. Since we speak here as friends, I can tell you certain circles in the United States have taken advantage of certain domestic developments to say things that would be difficult to permit otherwise. But the basic direction of our foreign policy is fixed. And of course our people are also watching Soviet developments, and as the Soviet Union develops new weapons, they are used as a justification for our new weapons.
Leonid Brezhnev: I don't quite agree on that and here is why:
By the time the SALT agreement was signed, the United States already had its multiple re-entry vehicles and we were behind the United States in that field. But nonetheless we did agree to sign the agreement on that score, proceeding from the most humane goal, which is embodied in the preamble to that [agreement]. And we undertook not to introduce any new missile systems and we accepted certain conditions for those, and those are being scrupulously observed.
Henry Kissinger: We don't question that.
Leonid Brezhnev: By the beginning of next year, perhaps I or perhaps someone else will be entrusted with making the relevant report, but we will accurately report what is taken out of commission and made into submarines. But we are not making any new weapons. It was agreed we both would engage in certain improvements but without any increase in diameter or any new systems. We have developed a MIRV but that is all that is taking place. So it is wrong to say we are devising something new. Even if something is being invented, we are not deploying anything in contravention of the agreement.
President Nixon said there are new submarines being developed in the United States, but while there are 42...
Henry Kissinger: 62.
Leonid Brezhnev: Yes, 62, we won't develop any new ones.
Henry Kissinger: If you want to make it 42, we won't object.
Leonid Brezhnev: We scrupulously observe that. We know you are making MIRVs on the submarines and replacing Poseidons with Minutemen.
Henry Kissinger: No.
Leonid Brezhnev: You're installing new missiles in place of older models.
Henry Kissinger: That is true.
Leonid Brezhnev: Within the limits of the improvements allowed by the agreement. So it is wrong to conclude that we're doing anything in contravention of the agreement. So as of this time, it is certainly a fact you are ahead of us in multiple warheads, as this is one aspect that can't lend itself to control by national means of detection. Since you were ahead, we assume you have more. If we have to apologize for something we're not doing ... The numbers you have are in excess of what we have. I'm not complaining about that. We should both scrupulously observe the agreement. You are refusing to take into account forward-based systems. Who are these aimed at? Not against France, because France can't declare war on the United States.
Henry Kissinger: But this may change if things keep up!
Leonid Brezhnev: Or Holland or Belgium, or the GDR or the FRG. I can show you a map. You said the agreement should relate to American missiles that could reach the Soviet Union and Soviet missiles that could reach the United States. That is the significance of those forward-based missiles. [He shows a small map.] They can reach Tashkent, or Baku.
Henry Kissinger: The submarines?
Leonid Brezhnev: Yes. And air bases. More than one-half of the European part of the Soviet Union is within range of those.
Henry Kissinger: We have to separate the problems. First of all, if M. Jobert makes more of his speeches, we'll need some of those missiles against France.
Leonid Brezhnev: You can't blame me for that! No speech ever caused destruction; only weapons have.
Henry Kissinger: So this line is the range of the submarines, and they're being counted. They are part of the agreement. They are not forward-based systems. They are counted in the interim agreement.
Gromyko: But they are pointed at us -- whether submarine or carrier-based aircraft. The first agreement left aside strategic aviation.
Henry Kissinger: I agree with that. That's a separate problem. These are our fighter aircraft?
Leonid Brezhnev: It's not a good picture is it? Those are European-based aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Then nothing else remains for us but to have our aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or missiles.
Henry Kissinger: I have two separate problems, Mr. General Secretary. According to our estimate, you're developing four new missiles. That's not in violation of the agreement. In fact, one of them impresses our people very much, and if that's only an improvement, I'd hate to see what a new system looked like. In fact, if I see Mr. Smirnov, I'll congratulate him on his new system.
Leonid Brezhnev: I can reply in place of Mr. Smirnov, and I can say we're not making a single new missile. We're improving our missiles.
Henry Kissinger: It's just a question of definition. It's such a great improvement that to our people it looks like a new one. But I won't debate it. But we're not saying it's in violation of the agreement.
Leonid Brezhnev: Let us not proceed from what people think but from official statements of governments, and from what lends itself to control.
Henry Kissinger: I agree.
Leonid Brezhnev: If we really get down to business, we should proceed from the assumption that in the time left before President Nixon's visit, our delegations will hardly be able to proceed without us. We will hardly be able to work out a solution that can be a permanent agreement.
Henry Kissinger: I agree.
Leonid Brezhnev: Let me suggest, perhaps then we could undertake to enter into a new arrangement where the first operative paragraph -- after the preamble -- says that the two sides have agreed to prolong the provisional agreement in its full measure, let's say, until the year 1980. That's the first point. That is, both remain with the existing levels. But just that alone would not exactly satisfy certain circles in the U.S.
Henry Kissinger: Not in its exact details. Quite candidly, this would be quite impossible in present conditions in the United States. It would strengthen Senator Jackson, quite frankly.
Leonid Brezhnev: So then, after this, we could have a second paragraph couched in the most categorical terms, which would say roughly that the two sides undertake that their delegations will continue their work to convert the provisional agreement into a permanent one. But even that would not be enough, I gather. Since these multi-warheads are constantly in the news, let's decide on a certain number of warheads on a certain number of missiles.
Korniyenko: The number of missiles to be equipped with multiple warheads.
Gromyko: That will be MIRVed.
Leonid Brezhnev: They could be listed in quantities or in percentages. For example, the United States will be entitled to MIRV 1,000 missiles and we will be entitled to MIRV 1,000 ICBMs.
[ Discussing in more detail his proposal -- which would extend the interim agreement until 1980 -- Brezhnev says that each side would have freedom to mix, that is, to determine which proportion of ICBMs or SLBMs would carry MIRVs. He goes on to discuss the difference between deploying new missiles and modernizing old ones.]
Leonid Brezhnev: [Draws a silo diagram on a piece of paper.] Say we had a silo launcher and our designer invents a narrower one; it's not a new missile. So we're free either to reconstruct this or install it on a submarine.
Henry Kissinger: Now I understand the difference between a new missile and an improvement. I have to compliment your designers; they've used the existing space with great skill.
Leonid Brezhnev: I can just say you have some wonderful designers too. They've put Minuteman III in the same hole, though it is a new rocket.
Henry Kissinger: [laughs] All I can say is, I hope you never come up with a new missile.
Leonid Brezhnev: Yours too.
Henry Kissinger: But basically we both have the same problem. Could I take a two-minute break?
Leonid Brezhnev: Certainly.
